Debates centered round regions and regionalism and the sharpened awareness of the possibilities of regional cooperation and institution building emerged in the post Cold War era. Three central elements have been identified by analysts as constituting the core elements of regionalism. First, a common historical experience and a sense of shared problems among a geographically distinct group of states/societies which constituted a region. Second, close linkages of a distinct kind between those states/societies, in other words recognition of a boundary to the region within which interactions would be more intense than those with the outside world, in other words, regionalisation. Finally, the emergence of an organisation giving shape to the region in a legal and institutional sense and providing rules of the game within the region, the element of conscious policy which is central to regionalism. [1] Therefore, while dealing with regionalism, three elements emerge as important. The first relates to the spatial dimension of regionalism, i.e., how large is the area covered and how is the area defined or redefined as conditions change. A second relates to its scope; in other words the tasks or areas of interaction covered by the region or by the regional organisation. A third feature is the level and extent of the organisation. [2] These three are useful since they indicate the variety and unevenness of regionalism. They also bring into focus the fact that regional organisations recognise boundaries both in terms of spatial dimension as well as in terms of scope.
The acceptance of these three as crucial brings into focus the fundamental question about the nature of the SCO, its aims and objectives. What was the SCO visualised to be — a regional security group, a trade bloc or something else? And more importantly how has it developed over the years? In any case, there is need to analyse whether the SCO was visualised as a ‘regional’ organisation and the way in which its region was defined. In the 1990’s the SCO had a clear criterion for membership — states that share a border with China. The Shanghai Forum was formed to deal with the requirements of confidence building measures at the borders of the states and resolve border disputes. As a ‘regional’ bloc it then defined itself as China and its immediate neighbourhood to its west. If we accept this to be the SCO region then its optimal permanent membership would be what it is today (though Uzbekistan does not share a boundary with China) with the possible inclusion of Turkmenistan. However, most ‘regional’ organisations expand and this expansion is generally related to the way in which their role is subsequently visualised. The SCO expanded with the inclusion of three categories of membership, observers, dialogue partners and guests. Mongolia, India, Pakistan and Iran were accepted as observers. Given the significance of Afghanistan to the regional security balance it has been accepted as guest. A looser form of affiliation has been introduced with the introduction of the category of dialogue partner. The initial choice of Belarus and Sri Lanka as dialogue partners demonstrates this to be the new less restrictive category which would enable the organisation to expand its geographical reach into Europe and South Asia, thus redefining the concept of the SCO region. Subsequently Turkey was accepted as a dialogue partner and more recently there has been agreement on acceptance of Belarus as observer and Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia and Nepal as dialogue partners. By looking beyond traditional partners, the SCO emphasised a readiness to respond to emerging complementarities and new avenues of cooperation. [3] This is a significant development and a distinct change from the immediate priories of the organisation when it was first conceived. It is, however, the inclusion of India and Pakistan as permanent members of the SCO that has raised the largest number of issues and most significantly the question whether ‘good neighbourly partnership’ would remain the principal focus of the organisation. It is in this context that the 16th SCO Summit assumes significance.
The debate on inclusion
The 16th SCO Summit scheduled to be held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on 23 to 24 June 2016 is expected to finally conclude the process of inclusion of India as a permanent member in the SCO. However, even before the beginning of the Summit, reports have tended to argue that the process of inclusion may not be the foregone conclusion that it is being assumed to be and that in any case the level of engagement that India would be offered within the organisation would be determined by existing members. At the Summit in Ufa (Russia) on 10 July 2015, Putin announced that the organisation was turning a “new page as the process of including Pakistan and India is being launched”. More significantly, the members reiterated their willingness to create a Development Bank and Development Fund and supported China’s proposal to create a Silk Road Economic Belt across the SCO member states. The SCO Summit which followed the BRICS Summit underlined the importance of stability in Afghanistan with the withdrawal of international forces. [4] Post Ufa, a debate initiated among strategic experts on Russia, China, India and the Central Asian states on the implications of inclusion of India and Pakistan’s in the SCO indicated that the acceptance of the two South Asian states within the SCO was far from resolved. [5] Sanat Kushkumbayev, Deputy Director of the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan was quoted as saying, “The start of India and Pakistan’s accession to the SCO was top of the agenda, but de jure the process has yet to be fully clarified. It is quite possible that an existing SCO member could block their entry”. Uzbek President Islam Karimov noted that the entry of India and Pakistan could change the balance of power inside the organisation and internationally. There remain a number of unresolved issues between India and Pakistan and how these would affect the SCO was unclear and Uzbek analyst Farkhad Tolipov seemed to be in agreement. There was general agreement that for China the SCO was now no longer crucial. It was the One Belt One Road, an infrastructural project with its own funding agency the AIIB that had become important for China. On the other hand the need for Chinese and Indian investment in infrastructural development seemed to be the motivating factor for the acceptance of the expanded membership among the Central Asian states. There is also the need to keep in mind the fact that there is disagreement among SCO members about certain issues like the level of involvement in Afghanistan. Russian President Putin supports increased involvement of the SCO in Afghanistan whereas Uzbek President Karimov defines Afghanistan as a “smouldering war with no end in sight” and argues that for the SCO to get involved it would mean assuming responsibility for Afghanistan something that would be assumed not just by the Afghans, but the entire world. He argues that the SCO needs to focus on long term interests, principally economic issues and increasing bilateral trade and investment. [6]
How far the issue of India’s SCO membership figured during the Russia-India-China (the RIC format is the core for the larger BRICS) foreign minister level meeting in Moscow on April 18, 2016 is also unclear. The joint communiqué issued after the RIC meeting noted:
Foreign Ministers of China and Russia reiterated the commitment of their countries to full and early implementation of the decisions of the SCO Summit Meeting in Ufa on July 10, 2015, and actively pushing forward the process of accession of India to the SCO. India expresses its willingness to become a full member of the SCO as early as possible so as to make greater contribution to the development of the SCO. It was agreed to work towards signing the Memorandum on India’s Obligations for Obtaining the Status of SCO Member State by the Organisation’s Summit in Tashkent in June 2016. [7]
Despite this ambiguity Tatyana Shaumyan, head of the Indian Research Center at the Institute of Oriental Studies, in an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, positively assessed the value of this meeting. “It is very important that the three foreign ministers keep the tradition of tripartite meetings. There exist problems, both international and bilateral, and common positions are being developed. Then there are issues on which differences remain unresolved between the countries, but the members of this forum are still willing to discuss their positions, on the basis of own national interests.” [8]
However, after the RIC meeting a commentary in the Chinese daily Global Times on India’s position on the South China Sea was illuminating. It noted:
For years, India has remained a prudent yet ambiguous stance over the South China Sea issue. At a sensitive moment such as now, India expressed the same attitude as China and Russia indicating a changing stance of mind. Why the case? One possible reason is that India has been striving for full fledged membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).. But India’s inclusion into the SCO has not been completed. India needs to prove that its accession can play a constructive role for the unity of SCO members and the international effect of the SCO. [9]
K. Bhadrakumar argues that the commentary has brought in a number of caveats to the issue of Indian inclusion:
- India needs to “prove” its intentions to play a “constructive role”,
- India’s rights as SCO member may not be on par with the other founder-members’,
- India’s policies will need to be in harmony with Russia and China’s, and,
- The proposed logistics agreement between India and US creates uneasiness, as it signifies a shift in India’s foreign policy. [10]
It is generally argued that for India joining the SCO is about “raising its stakes in Central Asia”, of greater connectivity to a wider resource rich region and an opportunity to work on common issues of concern. Iran’s membership will ensure that India can move towards developing a platform for trade and transit through Bandar Abbas and Chabahar then linking with the North South Corridor. There remains the possibility of the SCO acting as guarantor for projects like TAPI and the IPI which have been in the pipeline for a number of years. It would also provide a useful interface for interaction with Afghanistan and its neighbourhood. However, a number of analysts need to argue that India cannot be a real player in the Eurasian region as presently India lacks connectivity. The much travelled caravan roads to which one tends to hark back now move through regions that are geopolitically difficult for India to traverse. The only option is to connect with the INSTC through Iranian ports. There remains the argument that SCO engagement need not be over emphasised as bilateral engagement with the Central Asian states work just as well as illustrated by the uranium supply deal with Kazakhstan during Prime Minister Modi’s visit. [11] Also, for the membership to be useful, India would also have to take a constructive approach rather than pushing anti terrorism as an agenda with the obvious intention of pointing towards Pakistan. Analysts have also argued that beyond meeting annually and the creation of RATS, nothing constructive has come out of the SCO.[12] Of course the SCO meetings could provide a neutral ground for bilateral engagement and participation in RATS would mean new levels of intelligence sharing and development of counter terrorism strategy. However, this itself could become problematic in certain situations where India could consider its security to have been compromised by other members of the SCO. The fact that the core of the SCO would remain Russia and China and the two official languages of the SCO remains Russian and Chinese, despite expansion is also significant in terms of SCO members attitude towards expansion. On the other hand, there remains the fact that it is doubtful whether a Look East Policy on which there is emphasis today, can work without a corresponding policy on the West and it was with this idea that the Connect Central Asia Policy was initiated. However, India with its emphasis on the four ‘Cs”, commerce, connectivity, consular and culture would not match the Chinese engagement either economically or in political terms.
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