At the Seoul NSG plenary, China behaved not as an enlightened power but as a strategic small-timer

• ASHOK MALIK

Courtesy: Number 10/Flickr

What happened at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) plenary in Seoul? Much misinformation (even disinformation) is floating around New Delhi and for three reasons. First, the issues are complex and require context, which many may not have. Second, the political opposition to BJP is understandably using the occasion to target the Narendra Modi government and making partial assessments. Third, the Chinese propaganda mechanism has turned much more sophisticated in an intelligent and selective briefing of Indian media. This presents a challenge for India, but that is getting ahead of the story.

The thread begins in 2008, with India winning the waiver from the NSG to undertake nuclear commerce despite being a nuclear power outside the ambit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The next logical step was for India to apply for membership to four high-tech export-control regimes: the NSG, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement (conventional arms, dual-use tech) and the Australia Group (chemical-biological weapons).

Of these the NSG was a priority. The Group works on consensus. It had given India a waiver in 2008 but could in theory revoke the waiver or change its terms. If India was in the Group it could veto any change that would harm India, Teflon-coat the 2008 waiver and additionally contribute to the global nuclear regime. In 2010, President Barack Obama visited and promised support for Indian entry to the NSG and the other treaties.

Astonishingly, the UPA government did not apply. It made a noise, but nothing more. Its nuclear liability law, which had problems that were eventually sorted out by the Modi government in 2015, may have deterred it. The liability law had made the 2008 waiver infructuous and nuclear commerce with India near impossible.

India applied to the MTCR in 2015. After a setback it got in, on the second attempt, in 2016. In May 2016, it applied for NSG membership for the first time. By June most of the countries (about 40 of 48) were willing to take it in straightaway, no questions asked. This was a significant diplomatic achievement over two months.

Why did India apply now? A sympathetic American president is ending his term. His successor may be preoccupied at the time of the next NSG plenary in 2017. In 2018, India will be in election mode and the Modi government may have less leverage. As such, it was 2016 — or it was a kick down the road.

In Seoul the NSG delegates met on June 23. China insisted India’s application would not be discussed. Late in the day it agreed to the application being included in the agenda on the condition that no decision on the application would be taken in the 2016 NSG plenary. At this stage, the Indian delegation in Seoul knew immediate success was not possible. Barring a miracle that got the Chinese to change their minds, India would have to come away from Seoul with an “application filed”, not an “application approved”.

From then on, all discussion in Seoul was theoretical. Every country knew a decision on India was not happening this time. As the conversation continued, the Group broke into four:

• China opposed India full stop. It said India could join only if it signed the NPT,
• About 40 countries said admit India at once,
• Brazil, Mexico and Switzerland wanted two parallel announcements: India’s entry and a criteria for membership, which would mirror India’s nuclear record. It was understood no other country at present met those possible criteria, and
• New Zealand and Ireland wanted the criteria for membership to come first and then an announcement that India was meeting those criteria. They too understood no other country at present met those possible criteria.

South Africa oscillated between positions three and four. Turkey remained neutral. Nobody other than China said it didn’t want India or opposed India. Nobody, not even China, brought up Pakistan. It was recognised that since China had vetoed a decision on the Indian application this had become a normal diplomatic confab, not a decisive discussion.

The word “criteria” has been used more than once. What was the nub of “criteria”? It was not that an applicant should necessarily be a signatory to the NPT. It was that an applicant must adhere and commit to the spirit of the NPT. The 2008 NSG waiver explicitly stated India was part of the “widest possible implementation of the provisions and objectives” of the NPT. As such, 47 of 48 countries were fine with India not signing the NPT and validated India, with its impeccable non-proliferation history, as being NPT compatible.

What next? The application is before the NSG. There is a renewed effort to have a special plenary decide on it in 2016 itself. That may or may not happen, but the NSG cannot defer the decision indefinitely. More critically, China has shown its hand. Unlike 2008 much of the diplomatic legwork was done by India, and not the US. In any case the US has less influence on China than it did eight years ago.

It’s down to a shootout between New Delhi and Beijing. China is behaving not as an enlightened power but as a strategic small-timer, with the petty, perfidious and short-termist mindset of a Pyongyang dictator or a Rawalpindi general. India is honour-bound to send it a tough message. There is no option.

This commentary originally appeared in The Times of India.

Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is Senior Fellow

Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is Senior Fellow and Head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi. Dr. Rajagopalan joined ORF after a five-year stint at the National Security Council Secretariat (2003-2007), where she was an Assistant Director. Prior to joining the NSCS, she was Research Officer at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She was also a Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taichung, Taiwan in 2012. She is the author of four books: Nuclear Security in India (2015), Clashing Titans: Military Strategy and Insecurity Among Asian Great Powers (2012), The Dragon's Fire: Chinese Military Strategy and Its Implications for Asia (2009), and Uncertain Eagle: US Military Strategy in Asia (2009). She has also co-authored and edited five other books, including Iran Nuclear Deal: Implications of the Framework Agreement(2015). Her research articles have appeared in edited volumes, and in peer reviewed journals such as India Review, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Air and Space Power Journal, International Journal of Nuclear Law,Strategic Analysis and CLAWS Journal. Other writings have appeared in the Journal of Strategic Studies, Journal of Peace Research and Contemporary South Asia and she has also contributed essays to newspapers such as The Wall Street Journal, Times of India, Hindustan Times, Economic Times and Pioneer. She has also lectured at Indian military and policy institutions such as the Defence Service and Staff College (Wellington), National Defence College (New Delhi), Army War College(Mhow), and the Foreign Service Institute (New Delhi). She has also been invited to speak at international fora including the UN COPUOS (Vienna), Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), UNIDIR (Geneva), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the European Union.

Expertise

Her areas of research interests include Indian foreign policy and security issues, nuclear and space security, Asian strategic issues and US foreign policy.Nuclear Security, Space Policy, U.S. Foreign Policy, Asian Strategic Issues, Sri Lanka

Sour notes at the nuclear high table

• ABHIJIT IYER-MITRA

India appears to have successfully climbed into the category of a nuclear "have," overcoming the divisions enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and enforced fervently by its adherents. However, as India prepares to argue its case for entering the export control regimes, it will find that the new "status" will bring contentious new issues, which will demand careful consideration.

The reactions from Pakistan and Brazil make it clear that as India seeks to enter the export control regimes it must reckon with the aspirations of many countries

India appears to have successfully climbed into the category of a nuclear “have,” overcoming the divisions enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and enforced fervently by its adherents. Although not publicly acknowledged, India’s entry is the de facto reality and irreversible.

Nowhere was this more evident than at the recent Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference (April 8-9, 2013, at the Ronald Reagan Building International Trade Center, Washington D.C.) attended by more than 800 experts from around the world. Being the premier event of all things nuclear, the forum has long been the bastion of what Indian policymakers like to call the “nuclear ayatollahs” – those who obsessively pursue the NPT’s non-proliferation goals to the exclusion of almost everything else, especially disarmament.

The global nuclear community now treats India as one of the established nuclear weapons powers – however grudgingly – for matters of policy and debate. What little academic and intellectual opposition remains is largely normative. The debate has moved from the wisdom of granting India an exception via the India-U.S. civil nuclear agreement to whether India should be included in the four nuclear export control regimes where it wants membership.

But India’s acceptance in the established nuclear order has also triggered resentment – chiefly in Pakistan but more curiously in Brazil, India’s south-south partner in the new game-changing alignments such as BRICS and IBSA.

The old paradigms used to single out India – the sharp focus on proliferation – are still in vogue but were rarely invoked against New Delhi. They were applied exclusively to North Korea and Iran. Pyongyang’s daily threats, ratcheting up tensions in the peninsula ensured rapt attention at the conference. North Korea managed to obscure even Iran at times, which was generally seen as a rational actor eliciting various levels of sympathy.

This is not to say that India avoided criticism. But it largely had to do with the way India’s exceptional status had been accepted. Many felt that India had pulled a fast one on the U.S. but that things had now gone too far to retreat. Most of the talk was on how to make India accept its new role as a nuclear “have” more decisively and shed its current schizophrenic behaviour of acting like a “have not.”

Western analysts find India’s attitude self-defeating. India votes against Iran and with the West at the International Atomic Energy Agency but grudgingly. Yet it expects to get into the four regimes that control nuclear exports – the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. India’s reluctance on the Iranian case gives the impression that it doesn’t want to keep errant countries out. These impressions can easily be whipped into campaigns by nuclear hardliners.

Pakistan’s case

Unsurprisingly, India’s new status rankles Pakistan no end. Its team of more than 20 official and quasi official spokespersons raised objections against India in almost every panel at the conference. They demanded parity and a nuclear deal similar to the one the U.S. pushed through for India. Maleeha Lodhi, a former Pakistani Ambassador, said if Pakistan doesn’t get “equal treatment,” it would continue building nuclear stockpiles – a move that already has the nuclear community on edge.

Pakistan’s gripe is understandable – to a degree. Like India, it never signed the NPT and technically breached no undertaking by going nuclear. But its record on non-proliferation has been bad. The A.Q. Khan affair and his nuclear supply lines are and will remain a blot. So when Pakistani delegates tried to find analogies between their dilemma and every extant nuclear problem, they got a polite silence.

When M.J. Chung, a prominent member of South Korea’s National Assembly, provocatively advocated his country’s right to leave the NPT and build bombs in response to North Korean threats, a Pakistani delegate promptly equated India’s behaviour with North Korea’s. She demanded to know why South Korea wasn’t sympathetic to Pakistan’s case since her country had also tested the nuclear bomb in reaction to India.

When an Iranian attendee asked a panel why Iran was being targeted when, in fact, a Talibanized Pakistan was the main nuclear threat, a Pakistani countered that Maoists were a “bigger threat” to Indian nuclear reactors than al-Qaeda and Taliban were to Pakistani installations. The effect was often comical, sparking sniggers. If the idea was to drag India through the mud, no matter how disingenuous the argument, it failed. It only helped relegate Pakistan further to the margins.

Brazil’s discontent

Brazil’s rancour against India is and should be more worrying. It is also rooted in the Obama Administration’s purported “unequal treatment” of Brazil and India. Matias Spektor from Brazil’s top think tank, Fundação Getulio Vargas, recalled his country’s bitter disappointment at not getting President Barack Obama’s endorsement for a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council as India did.

Many Brazilians wrongly concluded it was because India had nuclear weapons and Brazil did not. They also feel India is being actively encouraged to project its power globally while Brazil draws criticism. The discontent has created a minority opinion in favour of Brazil going nuclear.

As India prepares to argue its case for entering the export control regimes, it will find that the new “status” will bring contentious new issues, which will demand careful consideration.

(Seema Sirohi is a senior journalist based in Washington. Abhijit Iyer-Mitra is a nuclear expert with Observer Research Foundation.)

Courtesy : The Hindu, April 18, 2013

What India has learnt about export control politics

• ARKA BISWAS

Source: Wikimedia Commons

India’s journey toward integration in the global non-proliferation and export control architecture hit a road-block in October when Italy is understood to have blocked India’s membership application to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

MTCR is one of the four global groupings that form a critical part of this export control architecture. It deals with non-proliferation of missile and related items and technologies that can be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Rome gave no explanation for its decision at the MTCR plenary in October, however a bilateral political dispute is reported to be the reason why Italy decided to stall India’s entry.

As India prepares the ground for entry into the other three export control bodies — the Nuclear Suppliers Group (on nuclear and related items), the Australia Group (on chemical and biological items) and the Wassenaar Arrangement (on conventional arms and dual-use goods) — there is a lesson to be learnt from the fate of its MTCR membership application vis-a-vis Italy.

That lesson would be that if an unrelated bilateral dispute can stall India’s entry into the MTCR, then bilateral overtures with other nations could also be used to garner support.

India seeks membership in the four export control bodies for both practical and reputational reasons. It wants to access some of the items whose exports are controlled by these bodies. It also wants its progress recognised, It was once an outlier, targeted by these groups; now it is a responsible global actor, ready to share the burden of prohibiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The global non-proliferation and export control architecture would also gain by bringing India into the fold as India becomes more and more prominent in the global trade of the exports that are controlled by these bodies. Having India inside the tent would allow the global non-proliferation community to ensure India abides by the same rules as other major players. India applied for membership to the MTCR after establishing this view with a majority of members of these export control bodies.

What India did not foresee is that the success or otherwise of membership applications to these consensus-based groups does not depend solely on the likely impact on the efficacy and the objectives of these bodies. Italy’s decision to stall India’s membership showed how bilateral political issues may also influence these decisions.

A British government official present at the MTCR plenary later noted in a closed-door dialogue that Italy did not make any objection to India’s application, and nor did it state it intended to block New Delhi’s entry. Rather, the Italian representative raised his country’s flag and stated Italy needed more time to consider this application. For now, at least, Rome’s decision keeps India out.

India-Italy relations deteriorated after Indian authorities arrested two Italian marines and charged them with killing two Indian fishermen in February 2012. The issue sparked a major diplomatic row that resulted in the resignation of Italy’s Foreign Minister, Giulio Terzi in March 2013. It is still a long way from being resolved.

There was no mention of this matter by the Italian representative at the MTCR plenary. Italy gave no reason for its action there and, indeed, none was required. There is, however, reason to believe Italy thinks it can gain an advantage vis-a-vis India on legal proceedings concerning the marines. News reports noted that Italy expects India to go easy on the marines issue ‘in lieu of support for MTCR membership’.

While this case demonstrates how support for membership can be used as leverage in resolving bilateral disputes, such consideration is neither new nor unique to the MTCR. Political issues have played a role in previous decisions on membership applications. For instance, a WikiLeaks cable published by the The Telegraph when Latvia sought MTCR membership noted that Russia is lobbying for Kazakhstan’s acceptance into the Australia Group, and that there has been talk about a trade – E.U. support for Kazakhstan in return for Russian support for remaining E.U. countries joining the MTCR.

Similarly, although China has not officially objected to India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, its attempts to group India’s membership case with that of Pakistan can be seen either as a way to block India’s entry or as a bargaining chip to serve its own political interests.

This fusion of politics with the objectives of the global non-proliferation and export control architecture is a matter of concern, as it dilutes the integrity as well as the credibility of the underlying norms and principles.

For India, Italy’s actions have been a set back. It is not clear how far Rome will push New Delhi on the marines issue in exchange for support of MTCR membership.

What is clear is that India has learnt an important lesson. Its pursuit of membership in these bodies has so far, and rightly, been based on its high standards of export control practices, its unwavering commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and its strong prospects as a supplier of sensitive items controlled by these bodies. If, however, unrelated bilateral disputes can stall India’s entry into the one of these bodies, then perhaps New Delhi needs to consider how it can work other bilateral relationships to clear its path to integration with the global non-proliferation and export control architecture.

It’s important to note that there are still some countries which have not made up their mind up on India’s membership plans. Where feasible, New Delhi must redouble its diplomatic efforts to negotiate quid pro quo deals and secure support for its entry into the four export control bodies from those countries still sitting on the fence.

This commentary originally appeared in the The Interpreter.

Wassenaar’s web: A threat to technology transfer

• ARUN MOHAN SUKUMAR

When in July Wikileaks published official records and internal correspondence belonging to Hacking Team – an Italian company that sells surveillance technology to governments and businesses – New Delhi too was caught in the crosshairs of the controversy that followed. Why did the Indian government talk shop with a little-known entity and its equally dodgy marketing agents, critics wondered, especially when Hacking Team had a history of selling spyware to autocracies in West Asia and North Africa? If lawful interception and espionage were indeed the stated objectives behind purchasing such technologies, why didn’t a government that spends trillions of rupees every year on defence spending simply go to a better manufacturer?

The answer to that puzzle lies in an instrument signed by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and 13 other countries in the Dutch town of Wassenaar two decades ago. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, as the 1995 instrument is called, may have replaced stringent Cold War regimes, but merely substituted the ideological divide with that of a different sort.

The Wassenaar rules perpetuate a digital divide by restricting Western companies and governments from supplying crucial technologies to emerging markets. The document draws from an expansive list, ranging from technologies relating to the telecommunications sector to digital sensors, computing and aviation: in other words, technology that is indispensable to governments if they are to protect their critical information infrastructure. The Wassenaar guidelines do not bind member states but make it incumbent on them to craft a strong export control regime.

The early nineties arguably made for a good case to articulate such an arrangement – though the Cold War had ended, its relics in the form of authoritarian governments and armed militias subsisted, requiring a carefully calibrated approach to sharing sensitive technologies. Today, the Wassenaar regime threatens to become obsolete on account of its failure to distinguish between the legitimate security needs of governments and misuse of high-end technology. Far from relaxing the export control regime, member states have piled on to its restrictions. In 2013, the Wassenaar Arrangement added a new category pertaining to “intrusion software” that could potentially be used as “monitoring tools”, or to thwart “protective countermeasures” in cyberspace. Hardware and software that helped “extract information” were also classified within this restricted category.

The sweeping definitions in the 2013 amendment to the Wassenaar regime have prompted both computer scientists and policy analysts to highlight the “chilling effect” it may have on cybersecurity research. Without access to growing digital economies, Western companies have no exposure to emerging security threats to Internet companies and users. More importantly, developing country governments have no means to strengthen their domestic cybersecurity sector without knowledge sharing from their advanced counterparts.

The concern that these “intrusion” technologies may be used by governments to engage in mass surveillance on their citizens is legitimate. However, the Wassenaar Arrangement does not offer any qualitative consideration of towards governments that have sound domestic policies and legal checks on unlawful interception of communication. Moreover, the claim that Western democracies have been scrupulous in deploying surveillance technologies has been spectacularly demolished by the Snowden revelations. The sheer scale and depth of cooperation among the Five Eyes countries – the U.S., U.K., Australia, New Zealand and Canada, all members of the Wassenaar regime – on indiscriminate and illegal data-gathering and surveillance stand exposed today.

Technology transfer between governments, then, is an overtly political act, with human rights consideration being an important strategic factor.

Whether the United States government will let these restrictive rules stand in the way of its political relationship with India, then, remains to be seen. In May this year, the U.S. Department of Commerce sought to incorporate the 2013 Wassenaar amendment into domestic legislation, triggering protest from Internet companies who seek a secure environment to operate in emerging economies. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has called the U.S. restrictions as an “unworkably-broad set of controls”. “Not only does the proposed implementation fail to contain Wassenaar exceptions, but it goes much further than the Wassenaar text,” argues EFF. During the subsequent two-month period created by the U.S. government to attract public comment on the proposal, it is understood that the Indian government too has expressed concerns regarding the wide scope of export controls.

Multilateral export control regimes – especially India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) – have been a subject of discussion between India and the United States for nearly a decade. In 2010, the U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor had suggested the Obama administration supported “India’s full membership” in the NSG and the Wassenaar Arrangement, but there has been little progress on this commitment. Its recent moves to absorb the Wassenaar rules could potentially complicate bilateral discussions on cybersecurity and Internet governance. For those within the Indian establishment seeking preferential treatment from the U.S. on technology transfer, the episode should serve as a reality check. If New Delhi – through its endorsement of the “multi-stakeholder” model of internet governance – recently signalled its willingness to play by the rules that the U.S. has set for cyberspace, it must also introspect whether the political costs of that decision will be offset by strategic gains.

Courtesy: The Hindu, August 5, 2015

India’s pitch for NSG membership

• ARKA BISWAS

The Indian Government's ratification on June 23 of the IAEA Additional Protocol, which is essentially a component of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal, will allow the international nuclear body to monitor India's civilian nuclear programme with ease.

“India has been seeking full-membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) along with three other export-control regimes, namely the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australian and the Wassenaar Groups. NSG was established in May 1974 with the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The 48-member group has set out guidelines for the export of nuclear and nuclear-related materials and technologies which are seen to be complementing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), along with several other nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) treaties. MTCR is an informal and voluntary association of countries that share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. The 41-member Wassenaar Arrangement aims to promote transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, while the Australia Group is an informal forum that aims at restricting exports related to production of chemical and biological weapons.

India’s membership of the NSG has been discussed each year since September 2008, when the group agreed to India-specific waiver, as part of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal. During a visit to India in November 2010, President Barack Obama affirmed his support for Indian membership of the NSG, along with the other three export control groups. In 2011 and 2012, the group came up with identical statements on the issue, saying that "it continued to consider all aspects of the implementation of the 2008 Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India and discussed the NSG relationship with India."

India, meanwhile, has continued to express its keenness in joining the NSG. Former Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, was quoted saying, at the plenary session of the second Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in 2012, that "India has never been a source of proliferation of sensitive technologies and we are determined to further strengthen our export control systems to keep them on par with the highest international standards. We have already adhered to the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime." He further added that "with the ability and willingness to promote global non-proliferation objectives, we believe that the next logical step is India’s membership of the four export control regimes." Indeed, India’s track-record has been exemplary, by virtue of which it has earned backing from the US, Russia, Australia, among other nations, in its attempt of getting a full-membership of the NSG.

Yet, efforts have been made to sabotage the possibilities of India getting a full-membership of the NSG. On June 20, 2014, IHS Jane’s, a US based defence think-tank, came up with satellite images of the Indian Rare Metals Plant (IRMP) near Mysore, in which the think-tank identified a "possible" new uranium hexafluoride plant. Experts from the think-tank have argued that the new plant will "support new centrifuges that will substantially expand India’s uranium enrichment capacity, most likely to facilitate the construction of an increased number of naval reactors to expand the country’s nuclear submarine fleet, but potentially also to support the development of thermonuclear weapons."

Three important facets of the report have to be examined. First is the case of an undeclared or covert uranium enrichment programme which the US think-tank alleges India to be operating. Indian officials have reportedly argued that "India is a declared nuclear weapon state and that it is under no obligation to restrict production." However, India has already showcased its position of restraining the expansion of its nuclear stockpile by participating in the negotiations of Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Though officials said that India will not accept a ban on the production of enriched uranium that is used for the propulsion of its nuclear submarines, they argued that the position is already known to the world and there is no need for India to run a covert enrichment programme.

Secondly, the report is based on the "possibility" of a new enrichment plant and there is, therefore, no credibility associated with the allegations that the "possible" new plant could facilitate the construction of an increased number of naval reactors to expand the country’s nuclear submarine fleet, or support the development of thermonuclear weapons. This, in fact, is the position taken by the US government over the IHS Jane’s report. The US State Department Spokesperson, Jen Psaki, called the report "speculative" and said that the US government is "not in a position to speculate" as they "do not have enough information or confirmation of the report."

Thirdly, and most importantly, the report has come out a few days prior to the NSG meetings held on June 23 in Buenos Aires, a critical time considering India’s pitch to get the Group’s full-membership. Officials in New Delhi argued that the report is intended at diverting focus off the real culprits of proliferation and noted that such reports questioning India’s nuclear credentials are planted at regular intervals."

While such efforts to sabotage the possibilities of India getting a NSG-membership have continued, India has reiterated its commitment to global non-proliferation goals and reaffirmed the seriousness with which it adheres to the same goals by ratifying the IAEA Additional Protocol on June 23. The ratification, which is essentially a component of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal, will allow the IAEA to monitor India’s civilian nuclear programme with ease.

In 2009, it was an agreement over an additional protocol that brought India’s civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, which paved the way for the NSG to grant India-specific waiver for it to participate in civilian nuclear commerce. The decision to ratify the additional protocol is bound to influence the NSG members into considering Indian membership with greater intent.

(The writer is a Junior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)

India can do without NSG membership, says expert

India doesn’t need to pursue membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) so vehemently as the waiver given to India in 2008 allows for trade in civilian nuclear power, import of nuclear power reactors and fuel under International Atomic Energy (IAEA) safeguards. And, there is no  hindrance for the expansion of India’s nuclear power programme, according to Mr. L. V. Krishnan, former official of Kalpakkam Atomic Research Centre.

Initiating an interaction on ”India and NSG” at the Chennai centre of the Observer Research Foundation on June 25, 2016, Mr. Krishnan, a former Director (Health and Safety) at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR), Kalpakkam, felt that there was not much to gain from seeking the NSG membership. When the NSG members, including China, realise that India has a huge trade potential, they will automatically come around someday, and hence there is no point in India approaching them, he said.

Mr. Krishnan explained the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Zangger Committee (aka nuclear exports committee). The Zangger Committee was formed in 1971 to achieve the aspects of non-proliferation. It was however seen as insufficient when India tested in 1974. Later, the members in the Zangger committee came together and formed the NSG in 1975. Although it was not explicitly formed to contain India, it was a mutually agreed reason to do so.

The Indian story

Mr. Krishnan stated that India was sounded out on joining the NSG in early 1990’s, but declined the offer as it wanted to test a second time, this time for its weapons programme. The tests happened in 1998. In the 2001, the NSG began dialogue to get China, India and Pakistan onboard. India obtained the one-time waiver in 2008 because of our deft diplomacy and heavy-lifting by the US.

During his visit to India in 2010, US President Barack Obama affirmed support for India’s entry into the NSG and three other groups (MTCR, Australia and Wassenaar Arrangements). In 2011, the NSG excluded transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology related material to India.

Mr. Krishnan also pointed out that India had complied with the considerations required for NSG membership. As much, or more than signing the NPT, India observes full adherence to the many of the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone treaties and full compliance with their obligations. Adherence doesn’t require a nation having to be a signatory to the treaty, he said. France had entered the NSG without signing the NPT. Moreover these are only considerations and are politically flexible. He also explained that India has an impeccable record in Non Proliferation and Export Control.

Broader plan

India’s interest in joining the NSG is part of a broader plan. India doesn’t wish to be seen as an exporter of biological, nuclear, chemical material and sensitive technologies, Mr. Krishnan said. He also stated that  in its time, India can set up locally-designed pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRS) in Bangladesh or Sri Lanka and offer services in decommissioning and waste management. However, there doesn’t seem to be much movement on this, he noted.

On the Westinghouse deal for AP-1000 nuclear power reactors, he said that it is wrong to construe it as a quid pro quo for seeking US support. It has no relation with India seeking membership to the NSG, he stated.

Responding to a query on safety of the AP1000 reactors, Mr. Krishnan pointed out that there are no safety problems in the reactors. Those who talk about safety each time such reactors are to be installed are either devoid of the required knowledge or are deliberately trying to scuttle the process by spreading hysteria, he said.

On the liability issue, there is still no clarity and local suppliers are keenly looking at the Westinghouse deal to get through, before taking the next step, he said.

Seoul plenary

On the NSG plenary in Seoul held on June 23 and 24, 2016 which ended inconclusively on India’s membership, Mr. Krishnan pointed out that few member countries felt that the separation of civil and military nuclear activities of India has been inadequate, thereby leading to difference of opinion. India could not obtain unanimous consent as some countries had raised certain objections.

China has very openly stated its resistance to India’s entry right from the beginning, he said. China’s insistence that India sign the NPT is a non starter, as that would amount to surrendering the stock of N-weapons which India strongly objects to. It also doesn’t acknowledge any single country waiver and calls for appropriate criteria for entry of non NPT States. China has also said that if the Nuclear weapon stockpile of India increases, it could disturb stability and affect balance of power in South Asia.

On Turkey’s opposition, Mr. Krishnan pointed out that although Turkey is a key ally of Pakistan, it was at China’s prodding that Turkey took a stand against India. China sells reactors to Turkey and both have strong economic relations. China leveraged this to its advantage, he pointed out.

Pakistan’s case

Mr. Krishnan said that members’ actions prior to joining the NSG are not liable to scrutiny. China, taking advantage of this, has been citing prior commitments and building reactors in Pakistan. This is in direct contravention of international law, he pointed out.

He opined that Pakistan was simply following India than trying to lead. Pakistan wants to seek parity with India. However, Pakistan needs a lot of preparatory work to be done. The US, he said, was trying to get India, Pakistan and China onboard the NSG and has been helping Pakistan in improving its export control facilities.

Mr. Krishnan was also against the idea that India was trying to gain NSG membership to prevent Pakistan from entering it. Doing so would portray India in bad light in international circles, he warned.

On a question as to how really would Pakistan benefit from NSG membership, Mr. Krishnan stated that it helps in securing access to sensitive technologies, as reactors built by China have only Chinese components and technology. It also gives them a feeling of enjoying equal status with India, he said.

Way forward

Mr. Krishnan felt that seeking excess support from the US may not be a good idea as we may then become beholden to US interests. He, however, stated that if NSG membership is to be seen as a priority issue, then it is important to engage the current administration, as the new President may not show the same enthusiasm.

He also said that additional steps must be taken to reassure the ‘holdout nations’ by further separation of civil and military facilities.

This report is prepared by Arjun Sundar, Associate, Observer Research Foundation, Chennai.

US Talk of Convergence with India is Contradictory

• KANWAL SIBAL

The India-US joint statement speaks of the convergence of interests of the two countries, with President Obama welcoming India's emergence as a major regional and global power and affirming his country's interest in India's rise.

The India-US joint statement speaks of the convergence of interests of the two countries, with President Obama welcoming India’s emergence as a major regional and global power and affirming his country’s interest in India’s rise. This encapsulates the vast agenda of the relationship and the grand motivating ambition. The protagonists of a strong India-US relationship tend to take as accomplished what is intended; the sceptics see rhetoric where there could be substance. What is needed is a dispassionate view, without baseless enthusiasm or wry cynicism.

The convergence of interests should first manifest itself in our region. The threats to India’s security arise within it, whether territorial claims, terrorism, Islamic radicalism, nuclear and missile proliferation or economic blockages. Central to this is Pakistan and its axis with China. If the US has a long term strategic partnership with a Pakistan that remains unremttingly hostile to India, how does it reconcile with that reality its strategic partnership with India? Does massive military aid to Pakistan correspond with India’s strategic interests? Is there any common understanding on the impact on India of the deepening political, economic and military ties between Pakistan and China, nuclear mates and united in their antagonism toward us?

Stating that none other than India has more interest in Pakistan’s stability and prosperity is wriggling out of the contradictions of US policy in South Asia. Does the US expect us to work with it to bolster the stability of a country that persists with its agenda to destabilize us, and continue exporting terror? General Musharraf’s recent warning against proceeding against Lashkar-e-Toiba, hugely popular in Pakistan because of its actions in Kashmir, is instructive. Persisting with offers of intervention in Kashmir and referring to it as a “dispute” is a bow in Pakistan’s direction. Some deference to Indian concerns has been shown, at the instance of our negotiators, in the call for “all terror networks, including LeT” to be defeated.

On Afghanistan, lauding India’s contribution to the country’s development to the point of proposing joint India-US projects with the Afghan government in capacity building, agriculture and women’s empowerment, vindicates India’s role that General McChrystal and the Pakistanis found provocative. Whether India should associate the US with its successful projects in Afghanistan and risk a backlash, or profit from US funds to expand its development programmes should be decided with great prudence.The issue in Afghanistan, of course, transcends Indian projects; our concerns about the US end game there remain unassuaged.
 
On Iran, US is not ready to accommodate India’s energy security interests, which are far more real than politically hollow references to our “civilisational relations” that Iran ignores. As in the case of Myanmar, pressuring countries like India to distance themselves from Iran has only helped China to fill the vacated space to India’s long term strategic detriment.  Indian companies and banks are not in a position to defy US and even EU sanctions. Obama was muted in his reference to Iran in his parliament speech, and the joint statement is cautiously worded, at India’s insistence no doubt, as the diplomatic route to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue is underlined, besides noting that the two sides  only “discussed” the need for Iran to meet its obligations to the IAEA and the Security Council, a formulation that should not displease the Iranians. Citing Myanmar, Obama chided us gratuitously on shying away from taking positions on human rights issues in international fora. He did not see the absurdity of his rebuke to India when US’s own ties with Paksitan follow a different logic, with General Musharraf’s Pakistan given the status of a non-NATO ally.

The US is watching China’s increasingly assertive behaviour; India considers China a strategic adversary, notwithstanding the official discourse and willingness to engage with it positively. Closer India- US ties are viewed by many as a hedging strategy against China’s rise. Significantly, Obama mentioned US’s renewed leadership role in Asia with strengthening of old alliances, and in this context encouraged India to not only “look” but “engage East”. The joint statement refers to an open, balanced and inclusive architecture in Asia- a formulation that denies China a security leadership role and politically supports that of the US. The agreement to deepen strategic consultations on developments in East Asia can be read in the China context, though India, while seeing the utility of forging  better understandings with the US over China, would avoid entangling itself with US-China differences to the degree it constrains its independent policy choices.

The positives emerging from the visit should be recognized: support for our UN Security Council permanent membership, removal of Indian space and defence organizations from the US Entity List, the realignment of India in US export control regulations, and US’s intention to support India’s membership of the four multilateral export control regimes(NSG, MTCR, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement) in a phased manner. At India’s asking, the US has moved forward on these complex issues, and to that extent, our diplomacy has achieved results. That does not, however, prevent a critical evaluation of the progress made.

US support gives wind to India’s UNSC candidature, but there is no sign that it will activate the process of UNSC expansion. The joint statement mentions India and the US partnering for global security- and no doubt on human rights issues- in that body during India’s two year tenure as non-permanent member. US “security” priorities being rather different from India’s, with divergent views on sanctions, easy understandings might be dificult to forge.

High technology trade, easing of export controls, membership of multilateral nonproliferation regimes, have been tightly linked in the joint statement in several places to India joining with the US to promote global nonproliferation objectives, commiting itself to abide by multilateral export control standards, adopting fully the export control requirements of the regimes in question to reflect its prospective membership, and agreeing to a “strengthened and expanded dialogue on export control issues, through fora such as the US-India High technolgy Cooperation Group”. India had already satisfied the US on export controls of international standards to obtain the nuclear deal. What exactly is the nature of additional export controls and how intrusive they would be?

India-US civil nuclear cooperation issue has been handled ably by our side, with the joint statement stipulating that it has to be on the “basis of mutually acceptable technical and commercial terms and conditions that enable a viable tariff regime for electricity generated”. While the Convention on Supplementary Compensation will be ratified by India in the coming year and the US companies will have a level playing field, India has also underlined that it will be consisitent with India’s “national” and international legal obligations. india has also stood firm on not signing the three foundational defence agreements with the US.

While key policy makers in India have a clear understanding of the nuances of India-US ties and the opportunities and traps that lie ahead, the wall to wall coverage given to Obama’s visit even in national newspapers shows lack of maturity and sophistication of the larger establishment in treating relations with the US. The society of a would-be global power should not have the temperament of a banana republic.

The writer is a former Foreign Secretary(sibalkanwal@gmail.com)